The fate of Iraq lies in the hands of three Shiite clerics

1. In Iraq, Let’s Fight One War at a Time -- by REUEL MARC GERECHT/NY Times

ONCE again American officials are growing dissatisfied with an Iraqi government. In Baghdad and in Washington, officials privately and the press publicly suggest that the Bush administration would prefer that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki fell, and that Adil Abdul Mahdi, a French-educated economist who is a vice president, would replace him. Mr. Maliki is politically too dependent, the reasoning goes, on the young Shiite militia leader Moktada al-Sadr, a scion of a prestigious clerical family and the boss of a pivotal bloc of votes in Iraq’s Parliament.

Mr. Mahdi may look like a good bet for Washington. He is a far more amiable gentleman than Mr. Maliki, and doesn’t appear to be emotionally distressed when he is in the company of Americans. His group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was created in exile in Iran; its militia, the Badr Organization, has never had a serious clash with the United States military and is less prominent in the sectarian strife than Mr. Sadr’s followers, the Mahdi Army. In addition, the Supreme Council’s top man, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, has long dealt directly and pleasantly with American officials.

Since President Bush is now immersed in a top-to-bottom Iraq review, in which a substantial surge of American soldiers into Baghdad seems ever more likely and the Army is again seriously considering directly confronting Mr. Sadr, the appeal of Mr. Mahdi and the Supreme Council may grow in Washington and Baghdad.

If so, the administration should nip in the bud such inclinations. Changing the Shiite parts of the Iraqi government and quickly taking on Mr. Sadr would do nothing to end the Sunni insurgency and the holy war of foreign jihadists against the new Iraq.

Indeed, such a tack would not likely diminish the appeal or the power of the Mahdi Army, which is largely made up of poor, radicalized young men whose families were brutalized by Saddam Hussein and have been savaged by Sunni Arab fighters since the fall of 2003.

Nor would changing prime ministers and confronting Mr. Sadr’s militia advance the cause of reconciliation among the Sunni and Shiite Arabs and Kurds, allow the Iraqi government to operate more effectively, or let American troops leave Mesopotamia one day sooner.

In fact, attacking Mr. Sadr now and elevating the Supreme Council is likely to accomplish the exact opposite of what we want. And it shouldn’t be that hard to see why: the sine qua non for peace in Iraq, and for a democratic future for the country, has always been unity among the Shiites. Any violent struggle between the Mahdi Army and Supreme Council could provoke anarchy throughout the entire Arab Shiite zone, including Iraq’s holy cities and the oil-rich south. As bad as things seem now, such Shiite strife could impoverish all of Arab Iraq, dropping the non-Kurdish regions to an Afghan-like subsistence level.

In such a situation, we would likely see the hyper-radicalization of the Shiites, who have already become more militant owing to the tenacity and barbarism of the Sunni insurgency. In addition, whatever fraternal and nationalist bonds remain among moderate Sunni and Shiite Arabs would probably disappear in a Shiite-versus-Shiite bloodbath.

We would do well not to underestimate how these age-old familial and national ties and sympathies still diminish the sectarian strife. A genocidal Shiite-versus-Sunni conflict in Iraq — a real possibility — would be much more likely after an intra-Shiite war that destroys the traditional social and religious hierarchy that has remained vastly stronger among the Shiites than among Sunni Arabs since the American invasion.

Yes, the forces of the Supreme Council might be able to beat Mr. Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army. Trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Badr Organization is a serious army that might handle Mr. Sadr’s more numerous and passionate supporters. The mullahs in Tehran, who have aided both Mr. Sadr and Mr. Hakim, would probably throw their support to the latter’s Supreme Council in the event of all-out war. Such a confrontation, beyond wrecking Iraq politically, would probably allow the worst elements in the Supreme Council — those who envision a religious dictatorship along the lines of Iran — to become more powerful within the party.

And an American assault on Sadr City, the impoverished Baghdad stronghold of the Mahdi Army, would be militarily and politically counterproductive if undertaken before the United States launches a serious new counterinsurgency against the Sunnis.

Even with a substantial surge of soldiers along the lines recommended by Jack Keane, a retired four-star general, and the military historian Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute — approximately 35,000 more combat troops — the United States still wouldn’t have enough forces to fight a two-front war against the Sunnis and the Shiites, as it briefly did in 2004.

In Iraq, the United States is much weaker than in 2004. So is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the moderate bulwark of the Shiite establishment — so the tentative support he gave yesterday for a plan to isolate Mr. Sadr should be taken with a grain of salt. Because of the nonstop insurgency, Shiite politics are fragile. We absolutely cannot afford to have an American effort to pacify Baghdad be seen as a “pro-Sunni” military assault on the capital’s densely populated Shiite ghetto.

If the administration first focuses militarily on the Sunni insurgency, as called for in the Keane-Kagan plan — and the press indicates Mr. Bush is taking the two men very seriously — the United States and the Iraqi government would be better able to diminish sectarian violence. With more troops, we can clear and hold Sunni areas in Baghdad and thereby prevent Shiite militias from streaming out of Sadr City to attack defenseless Sunnis.

Shiite militias are clever predators. They fear American power — the confrontation in Najaf in 2004, during which thousands from the Mahdi Army perished, taught them about the destructive capacity of the American military. If the Americans leave sufficient forces in cleared Sunni areas, they will stay away. But if we pass the holding part of counterinsurgency campaigns to ill-equipped units of the Iraqi Army and to the Iraqi police, who often aid Shiite militias, they will pounce.

Only after Baghdad’s Sunni neighborhoods are fully secured can the Americans turn their attention to the Shiite quarters, ensuring that American and reliable Iraqi forces control the streets and municipal facilities necessary to sustain city life. We may eventually have to confront militarily the Mahdi forces inside Sadr City, but we want to do this only as the last step in counterinsurgency operations in the capital.

Mr. Sadr and his radicalized followers — temperamentally, they are as much children of Saddam Hussein as are the savage Sunnis who glorify the murder of Americans and Shiite civilians — are unlikely to become peaceful players in Iraqi politics. But Mr. Sadr’s reputation can be reduced and his charisma countered if ordinary Shiites have more moderate alternatives, backed by American power, who can protect them from insurgency-loving Sunnis and death-squad Shiites.

It’s unclear how Prime Minister Maliki will react to any American effort to diminish Mr. Sadr. His party, Islamic Dawa, is a bundle of mostly militant contradictions. In the end, President Bush may have to ignore the prime minister if the latter sides with Mr. Sadr.

And some Shiites, and perhaps most Sunnis, may threaten to walk out of Iraq’s government and forsake reconciliation talks if the Americans get serious about pacifying Baghdad and the insurgency elsewhere. Let them. If the city’s and country’s Shiites, who represent about 65 percent of Iraq’s population, see that the Americans are committed to countering the insurgency, any protest from Mr. Maliki or call to arms by Mr. Sadr will have increasingly less power.

No, it won’t be easy — but with American and Iraqi troops all over Baghdad and daily life returning to some normality, the situation will certainly be more manageable than what we confront now. The politics of peaceful Shiite consensus, which is what Grand Ayatollah Sistani has tried to advance since 2003, could again rapidly gain ground.

No progress can be made in Iraq, however, if the Sunni Arabs, who have regrettably embraced the insurgency and holy war in large numbers, are allowed politically to check counterinsurgency operations.

The key for America is the same as it has been for years: to clear and hold the Sunni areas of Baghdad and the so-called Sunni triangle to the north. There will probably be no political solution among the Iraqi factions to save American troops from the bulk of this task. The sooner we start in Baghdad, the better the odds are that the radicalization of the Iraqi Shiites can be halted. As long as this community doesn’t explode into total militia war, Iraq is not lost, and neither is Mr. Bush’s presidency.

(Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.)


2. Cleric weighs 1-month cease-fire in Iraq -- by QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA/Associated Press

BAGHDAD, Iraq - Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who heads a militia feared by Iraq 's Sunnis, is considering a one-month unilateral cease-fire and may push his followers to rejoin the political process after a three-week boycott, officials close to him said Wednesday.

The issue is expected to come up at a meeting Thursday in the holy city of Najaf between al-Sadr and a delegation representing the seven Shiite groups that form the largest bloc in Iraq's parliament, the Shiite officials said on condition of anonymity because of the secrecy of the talks.

In perhaps an even more important session, the delegation will also sit down with the country's top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Officials from several factions confirmed the planned trip to Najaf.

The visit is intended to allow the Shiite bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance, to work out some of Iraq's biggest political obstacles in front of al-Sistani, and to pressure al-Sadr to rein in his fighters and rejoin politics — or face isolation, participants said.

Until the walkout, al-Sadr's faction had been an integral part of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's governing coalition. Cabinet ministers and legislators who belong to al-Sadr's movement called the boycott after al-Maliki met with President Bush in Jordan three weeks ago. Al-Sadr's militia and its offshoots have been increasingly blamed for sectarian attacks.

As violence rages across Baghdad and much of Iraq, a new coalition taking shape among Shiites, Kurds and one Sunni party is seen as a last-ditch effort to form a government across sectarian divisions that have split the country. While al-Sadr's movement would not be part of this coalition, such an alliance — which reportedly is supported by the Bush administration — might pressure the radical cleric to soften his stance.

In Thursday's meeting, the group wants to assure al-Sistani that the new coalition would not break apart the Shiite bloc, said officials from several Shiite parties. Potential members of the coalition said they have been negotiating for two weeks, and now want the blessing of al-Sistani, whose word many Shiites consider binding.

The movement is backed by the U.S. government, said Sami al-Askari, a member of the Dawa party and an adviser to al-Maliki.

"I met the American ambassador in Baghdad and he named this front the 'front of the moderates,' and they (the Americans) support it," al-Askari said.

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad could not comment on the ambassador's meeting or his position on the possible coalition deal.

However, two prominent figures in the proposed coalition went to Washington to meet Bush separately in the past three weeks: Tarek al-Hashemi of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, known as SCIRI. The U.S. supports two other potential members, the Kurdish Democratic Party and President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

"The U.S. wants to see an Iraq that is united, stable, democratic and prosperous. We will continue to work with the democratically elected government of Iraq to reach this goal by improving security, promoting national reconciliation and the rule of law and helping the Iraqis deliver essential services," U.S. Embassy spokesman Lou Fintor said.

After meeting al-Sistani, the delegation will visit al-Sadr to try to persuade him to tell his followers to return to politics, and to assure him that the new coalition — still being completed — will not isolate his movement, said officials from several factions, including al-Sadr's movement.

"Tomorrow we will visit Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr, though the (coalition) front has not yet been formed, due to the demands of the Iraqi Islamic Party," al-Askari said.

His and al-Maliki's Dawa faction has expressed willingness to join the coalition, but fears it could weaken the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, Dawa officials said on condition of anonymity because the deal was not final.

"We will inform al-Sistani about the latest developments and assure Muqtada al-Sadr that he will not be sidelined from the political process. We want him to change his mind and be a part of that process," al-Askari told The Associated Press.

Officials close to al-Sadr said they believe the firebrand cleric and his followers would turn a friendly ear to the coalition, out of fear of being sidelined in the future.

Fearing such political isolation as well as possible attack by U.S. forces, al-Sadr will secretly order his Mahdi Army militia to abide by a one-month halt in fighting, said a Shiite politician, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the negotiations. He did not give further details.

Another official close to al-Sadr did not speak about the planned truce directly, but said when asked about it that "the security situation will improve in the coming month."

Even if al-Sadr commands his militia, the Madhi Army, to halt sectarian attacks for a month, questions remain as to whether violence would decrease. The militia is believed to be increasingly fragmented, with some factions no longer reporting to him, and a call for a truce could further divide it.

In exchange for a halt in fighting, al-Sadr's followers want officials from al-Hakim's Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq to make a promise in front of al-Sistani that they will not sideline al-Sadr's movement, said a member of al-Sadr's group.

The Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni coalition was not a done deal, though. Several Shiites complained about conditions set by the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, which they said could jeopardize an agreement.

"The demands of the Iraqi Islamic Party are not logical and it is hard to implement them," said Humam Hamoudi, a SCIRI lawmaker. For example, the Sunni party wants all checkpoints leading to and from Baghdad to have an equal number of Shiite and Sunni guards, he said.


3. Shiite Clerics' Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq -- by Sudarsan Raghavan/Washington Post

BAGHDAD -- In the quest to create a new Iraq, two powerful clerics compete for domination, one from within the government, the other from its shadows.

Both wear the black turban signifying their descent from the prophet Muhammad. They have fought each other since the days their fathers vied to lead Iraq's majority Shiites. They hold no official positions, but their parties each control 30 seats in the parliament. And they both lead militias that are widely alleged to run death squads.

But in the view of the Bush administration, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is a moderate and Moqtada al-Sadr is an extremist. As the U.S. president faces mounting pressure to reshape his Iraq policy, administration officials say they are pursuing a Hakim-led moderate coalition of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurdish parties in order to isolate extremists, in particular Sadr.

Hakim, who once verbally attacked U.S. policy, now senses a political opportunity and is softening his stance toward the Americans. Sadr's position is hardening. Young and aggressive, he has suspended his participation in Iraq's government and is intensifying his demands for U.S. troops to leave the country.

Their rivalry is rising as the moderating influence of Iraq's most revered Shiite figure, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, is fading on the streets of Baghdad and is being replaced by allegiance to militant clerics such as Sadr, according to Iraqi officials and analysts.

They question whether Hakim can counter Sadr's growing street power without worsening the chaos. As President Bush ponders limited alternatives in forging a new approach in Iraq, some wonder whether the United States is overestimating Hakim's ability.

The U.S. embrace of Hakim "will deepen their rivalry," said Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish legislator. "And it will deepen the rifts between the United States and the Sadrists."

Across Baghdad, as the fourth year of war nears an end, many Iraqis are asking one question: Can their prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite politician backed by Sadr, balance U.S. demands to distance himself from the cleric and move their country forward?

Competing Strategies

In Karrada, a mostly Shiite Baghdad neighborhood of large, tan houses owned by educated professionals and bureaucrats, the trim-bearded Hakim smiles from a large billboard in front of his headquarters.

The son of an ayatollah, Hakim wears the long, black robes of an Islamic scholar. He spent years in exile in Iran , where his political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was founded as an armed opposition group to President Saddam Hussein, who brutally oppressed Shiites.

Less than a mile away in a bustling, working-class section of Karrada, in a poster hanging in a grimy sidewalk restaurant, the thick-bearded Sadr weeps.

The son of Iraq's most respected populist cleric, who was assassinated by Hussein's government in 1999, Sadr remained in Iraq during the repression. He has stayed faithful to his father's vision, deriving his power from the seminary and the followers he has mobilized from Iraq's streets.

After the invasion, as a Shiite religious revival blossomed, Iraq's clerics saw themselves as the caretakers of the nation's Islamic identity. They were as concerned about American power and ambitions for Iraq as they were about the importation of a decadent Western culture. Many refused to deal with U.S. officials, preferring to preserve their status as outsiders, a tactic that reaps immense rewards today from a population that is increasingly disenchanted with the United States.

"There's no necessity to meet the Americans," said Beirut-based Hamid al-Khafaf, the chief spokesman for Sistani. He added that Sistani favored peaceful resistance to end the U.S. occupation.

Hakim and Sadr approached the Americans differently. Hakim joined the 25-seat Iraqi Governing Council set up by the interim U.S. administration of L. Paul Bremer. Through his involvement in the government and his allegiance to Sistani, Hakim built up his power base.

Sadr went to war against U.S. forces, launching two major uprisings in the spring and summer of 2004 in the southern holy city of Najaf. Soon, Hakim and Sadr turned on each other. In Iraq's Shiite-dominated south, Sadr's militias have attacked the offices of Hakim's party, SCIRI, and fought with his forces.

Today, the control Hakim's armed wing, the Badr Organization, exerts over Karrada is dwindling. Since the February bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra, which triggered an ongoing cycle of revenge killings, Sadr's Mahdi Army has pushed into mixed Shiite and Sunni neighborhoods across Baghdad. In recent months, it has arrived in Karrada, its stated goal to protect Shiite brethren from Sunni Arab insurgents.

'Pouring Their Poison In'

Inside the Sayyed Idris mosque, a large shrine in Karrada with an ornate blue-and-yellow tiled minaret, Haji Abbas al-Zubaidi is a witness to this changing world.

For years, the picture of Hakim's white-bearded brother, Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir Hakim, who was killed by a car bomb in 2003, hung in the mosque's library along with images of Sistani and a collection of revered Shiite saints. Now, pictures of Sadr and his father hang along with them.

Baghdad's sectarian strife now rules Zubaidi's life. In recent weeks, car bombs and mass kidnappings have rocked his neighborhood. Zubaidi, who has lived in Karrada for 35 years, sees the Mahdi Army, not the Badr Organization, as his main source of protection. It has created "popular protection committees" that watch over blocks, as they do in the Mahdi Army's stronghold of Sadr City.

"The terrorists are pouring their poison into our neighborhood," said Zubaidi, slim with long, slender fingers and a narrow face, as he sat on a large red carpet inside the mosque. "The sons of Karrada who have joined the popular committees and the Mahdi Army are now 98 percent in control. We have noticed that many of the attempts have been foiled."

Zubaidi and other educated Karrada residents continue to obey Sistani's pacifist vision and view him as their preeminent leader. But younger Shiites, while still revering Sistani, have switched their allegiances.

"We imitate and follow Sayyed Sistani," said Zubaidi, using an honorific for Sistani. "As for the field commanders and the young men, they are followers of Moqtada Sadr."

As the militancy grew, U.S. officials viewed Sistani as the most influential voice of moderation in Iraq. A gray-bearded, Iranian-born cleric in Najaf whose pronouncements carried the force of law, he stepped in with calming statements at momentous points in Iraq's post-invasion history. One Sistani appeal ended Sadr's last rebellion against U.S. forces.

But since the February bombing, Sistani's words have had little impact, Iraqi officials say. Shiite militias have attacked Sunni Arab mosques. Bodies of young Sunni men, blindfolded and tortured with drills, turn up daily in ditches and trash dumps. Sistani has made three fruitless statements to stop the killings.

"Now when you have daily mass killings, it makes such a call for restraint weak," said Ali Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman with close ties to Sistani.

Sadr's Mahdi Army militia perpetrated many of the attacks, and Hakim's Badr Organization committed torture and other atrocities, U.S. and Iraqi officials say.

Rivals Sharply Divided

The rivalry between Sadr and Hakim has unfolded mostly on the political stage. The two leaders joined the alliance that produced the current government, but soon their visions diverged. This year, Sadr threw his support behind Maliki largely to stop Hakim's candidate, current vice president Adel Abdul Mahdi, from becoming prime minister.

Hakim and Sadr are also sharply divided over whether Iraq should split into autonomous regions. Hakim is pushing for a separate Shiite region in the south, but Sadr, who views himself as an Iraqi nationalist, wants to keep the country unified.

Senior Sadr officials have circulated a petition among national lawmakers demanding a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. They have managed to get 131 signatures, nearly half of the parliament, Othman said.

"Politically, we can make the occupation withdraw," said Mustafa Yacoubi, Sadr's top deputy and a cleric who wears a black turban.

Hakim, meanwhile, has shown his pragmatism, understanding that he needs U.S. troops and support to balance the growing power of Sadr. Last month, he met with Bush, an action that many observers saw as the U.S. hedging its gamble on the weak Maliki government. Bush also met with Iraq's Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashemi, leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party. Hashemi is perceived by Washington as a moderate, although many Iraqis would disagree.

"Maliki is very worried about this turnabout," said Wamid Nadhmi, a political analyst in Baghdad. "This is because of his affiliation with Moqtada Sadr and the promotion that Mr. Bush is giving to Mr. Hakim. Maliki is seeing his political end, that they are trying to form a new government with the approval of the Americans."

U.S. pressure on Maliki to isolate Sadr is growing. American officials have declared Shiite militias -- particularly the Mahdi Army -- the most significant threat to Iraq's stability. Maliki has not cracked down on the militia of his political benefactor. He and his Shiite Islamic Dawa Party are also resisting U.S. attempts to build a moderate coalition.

In many circles, Iraqis question whether Hakim and other so-called moderates can curb the growing power of Sadr.

"I have serious doubts about Mr. Hakim's influence among the Shiites, and I have serious doubts of Hashemi becoming the leader of Sunnis," Nadhmi said.

It's a sentiment shared in Karrada. "Al-Hakim is not loved by the people," said Abdul Amir Ali, a burly Shiite shopkeeper. "People love the Islamic Dawa Party and Maliki because they don't have militias."

In the sidewalk restaurant where Sadr's poster hangs, its owner, Ali Hussein, points at clusters of young men nearby. They are all Mahdi Army, he said. And so is he.

Hakim, he said, made a fatal mistake by meeting Bush. In today's Iraq, credibility and power are measured by opposition to the United States.

"At this time, whoever has his hands with the Americans or Jews is not an Iraqi," said Hussein, as he chopped up cubes of lamb. "So how could Hakim put his hands with the Americans? There will be tensions because Sayyed Moqtada Sadr is a revolutionary man, like his father. Even if Hakim tries to come back to Sadr, Sadr will never receive his hand."

If the rift between Hakim and Sadr deepens, moderate Shiites fear, all Iraqis may suffer. "It should not leave any shadow on a fragile situation on Iraq," said Dabbagh, the government spokesman. "Iraq cannot absorb such a shock."


4. Concern for the Truth
The foundations of democracy are at risk as soon as a country accepts - as the United States did with the war in Iraq - lies and illusion.
By Tzvetan Todorov/Liberation

One of the most interesting conclusions of the Baker-Hamilton report resides in the observations that, since the war in Iraq, the American government has often sought to rule out any information that runs counter to its policies, and that this refusal to take the truth into account has had calamitous effects. The report says so in measured, but firm, terms: "Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals." In other words, the American government has held truth to be a negligible value that could easily be sacrificed to the will to power.

This reflection is not really a surprise for observers outside the United States. The preparation and unleashing of the war were based on a double lie or double illusion - that is, that Al-Qaeda was linked to the Iraqi government and that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, biological, or chemical. Since the fall of Baghdad, this casual attitude to the truth has been in constant evidence. At the very moment when the images of torture in Abu Ghraib prison were being revealed to the whole world, the US asserted that democracy was being securely implanted in Iraq. Then, while hundreds of prisoners had already been moldering for five years in the camp at Guantanamo, subjected to degrading treatment, without any trial or any possibility of defending themselves, [the US government] declares that the United States is using its forces in defense of human rights. The very same people who declare that they are the incarnation of freedom have legalized the use of torture. The Baker-Hamilton report chose not to go into the past; it simply notes that the refrain repeated until recently that "everything is going well in Iraq" does not strictly correspond to the truth.

What is surprising, on the other hand, is that it was possible in a great democracy like the United States to parenthesize the question of the truth for close to five years. That is worrying: In spite of the pluralism of the parties, in spite of the freedom of the press, it is therefore possible to convince the population of a liberal democracy that black is white and white, black. How to explain this vulnerability?

We must first concede that, in any country whatsoever, the greater part of the population blindly obeys opinion makers, politicians, and media officials (while advice from abroad is habitually treated with contempt). If, as of September 2002, there were plenty of lucid statements in the United States from some politicians and some organs of the press, these statements were not carried by institutions in the foreground, by the Democratic Party, the big television stations, nor the main newspapers. The country allowed itself to be submerged under a wave of patriotism that relegated concern for the truth to the background.

This abandonment of the duty of truth among opinion makers does not reflect some nefarious intention, but rather the fear that seized the country's population following the September 11, 2001, attacks. The need to protect one's own life, to assure the security of one's loved ones, to eliminate threats judged to be imminent, made everyone forget habitual precautions. Verifying and evaluating the news, arguing and reasoning were perceived as signs of a lack of courage and sense of responsibility. Meanwhile, fear is a poor counselor, and we must be afraid of those who live in fear.

Are European countries better protected than their American friend against this deviation produced by fear - this propensity to ignore the truth in the rush toward the objectives they have set for themselves? It may be that they possess some additional defenses, the reverse side of their very deficiencies: their plurality and the consequent obligation to listen to the neighbor's opinion, the awareness that their recent past is hardly entirely glorious. But one should not count too much on these differences: It would be enough for an enemy to make threatening statements, for a few spectacular events that arouse overpowering emotion to occur for the French, Italians, or Spanish to decide in their turn that danger is imminent, that all means are good ones in combating it, that it is not the time to patiently seek out the truth. Thus, already, here and there, people talk about Islam, its army of terrorists, and its future atomic bomb.

It's not because a danger is real that the measures taken to counter it become legitimate. Immediately after the Second World War, the Soviet Union inundated Western countries with their spies and sought to influence their policies; nonetheless McCarthyism and the 1950-1954 witch-hunt inflicted lasting harm on American society. In the 1930s, the Soviet threat to Europe was indeed real, but it was Hitler who pushed Germany into war, and he did so by (among other things) exacerbating his fellow citizens' fear of the Bolsheviks.

In totalitarian countries, truth is systematically sacrificed in the struggle for victory. But in a democratic state, the concern for truth must be sacred: The very foundation of the system is in play. Germaine Tillion understood this very well: a member of one of the first resistance networks in Paris, she wrote a tract in 1941 in which she called on her comrades-in-arms to never compromise over the truth, even if that didn't immediately contribute to victory: "For our homeland is only dear to us on the condition that we never have to sacrifice the truth for it."

(Tzvetan Todorov is a historian and philosopher. Born in 1939 in Bulgaria, Tzvetan Todorov moved to France in 1963, fleeing communism. Since 1987, he has directed the research center for the arts and language at CNRS [the French National Social Sciences Research Center]. A globally recognized intellectual and theorist of structuralism, he belongs to the tradition of humanist thinkers.)


5. It's Not Just Bush: We're Accountable Too -- by Heather Wokusch

Blaming everything on a handful of people at the top, no matter how destructive and abusive they've been, misses a critical point. Systems tend to self-perpetuate. Remove one player and the next comes in to ensure business as usual.

Remove Rumsfeld, a man who helped prop up Hussein in the 80's and skewed intelligence towards war, and who do you get? Robert Gates, a man who helped prop up Hussein in the 80's and skewed intelligence towards war.

Replacing those in power won't help if the power structure itself doesn't change. And that means addressing how our own actions maintain this dysfunctional system.

Decades ago, Rumsfeld and Cheney hoodwinked the American people with fearmongering lies about Soviet military capability, setting the country on a path of paranoia and weapons build-up. 911 let them pull the exact same trick again, with a public more focused on macho vigilantism than on facts and diplomacy.

But the dirty little secret remains: a combative foreign policy requires perpetual conflict. After all, tough-talking cowboys and weapons manufacturers have little value in times of peace, so it's in their interest to foment never-ending strife. Maybe that's why top Pentagon strategist Air Force Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler recently warned Americans to prepare for a 50-100 year "generational war."

The Democrats also seem to be hunkering down for a long-term battle against evildoers; their "Six for '06" goals call for doubling the size of "Special Forces to destroy Osama bin Laden and terrorist networks like al Qaeda." An October 2006 report from the Democratic Leadership Council's Progressive Policy Institute additionally noted: " America needs a bigger and better military ... Democrats should step forward with a plan to repair the damage, by adding more troops, replenishing depleted stocks of equipment, and reorganizing the force around the new missions of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and civil reconstruction."

The wild card in this march towards military domination remains Iran. Bush has already promised Israel protection if it bombs Iran's alleged nuclear facilities, and just this week, Congress voted to double the US stockpiles of military equipment in Israel (turns out that Israel had used much of the US equipment during its war with Lebanon this summer). Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert's recent admission that Israel possesses nuclear weapons is not expected to impact the billions in aid the country receives each year either, even though the US officially bans funding to those producing weapons of mass destruction.

While US involvement in an attack on Iran would invite Armageddon, Bush is backed into a corner domestically and may feel he doesn't have a whole lot to lose. Leading Democrats (including Clinton and Obama) have also called for the "military option" to be available for Iran, and would most likely push for troops/weapons to protect Israel from retaliation.

Some consider war with Iran as inevitable, but it isn't. The results would be catastrophic and the diplomatic options have not been adequately explored. More to the point, we must consider how the very legitimizing of perpetual conflict is devastating our national security. The Pentagon's budget currently runs over $430 billion per year, not including the roughly $140 billion spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Democrats are expected to increase the military budget next year. Meanwhile, domestic social programs are being slashed to compensate for war spending and our military has become severely weakened. $430 billion per year

The upshot? We the people need to retire tough-talking cowboys in both political parties and dump the idea that perpetual conflict is a given. We have to hound members of the 110th Congress to pursue every possible option for peace in the Middle East and we must confront the fear of faceless enemies which legitimizes rollbacks in our own civil liberties. Above all, we must hold ourselves accountable not to be fooled into war again.

Action Ideas:
1. To learn more about the lies leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq:
- Iraq on the Record ( http://democrats.reform.house.gov/IraqOnTheRecord/ )
- DowningStreetMemo.com ( www.downingstreetmemo.com )
- AfterDowningStreet.org ( www.afterdowningstreet.org )
2. To explore peaceful approaches to foreign policy:
- Foreign Policy In Focus ( www.fpif.org )
- Global Issues ( www.globalissues.org )
- One World ( www.oneworld.net )
- Just Foreign Policy ( www.justforeignpolicy.org )
3. To identify the cost of the Iraq War to U.S. taxpayers:
- Cost of War ( www.costofwar.com )

(Heather Wokusch is the author of The Progressives' Handbook: Get the Facts and Make a Difference Now (Volumes 1 & 2), and can be reached via her site at www.heatherwokusch.com)


6. Flunking Our Future -- by MAUREEN DOWD/NY Times

WASHINGTON -- The only sects that may be more savage than Shiites and Sunnis are the Democratic feminist lawmakers representing Northern and Southern California.

After Nancy Pelosi and Jane Harman had their final catfight about who would lead the House Intelligence Committee, aptly enough at the Four Seasons’ hair salon in Georgetown, the new speaker passed over the knowledgeable and camera-eager Ms. Harman and mystifyingly gave the consequential job to Silvestre Reyes of Texas.

Mr. Reyes promptly tripped over the most critical theme in the field of intelligence. Jeff Stein, interviewing the incoming chairman for Congressional Quarterly, asked him whether Al Qaeda was Sunni or Shiite.

“Predominantly — probably Shiite,” the lawmaker guessed.

As Mr. Stein corrected him in the article: “Al Qaeda is profoundly Sunni. If a Shiite showed up at an Al Qaeda clubhouse, they’d slice off his head and use it for a soccer ball.”

Mr. Stein followed up with a Hezbollah question: “What are they?” Again, Mr. Reyes was stumped.

“Hezbollah,” he stammered. “Uh, Hezbollah. Why do you ask me these questions at 5 o’clock? Can I answer in Spanish?” (O.K. ¿Que es Hezbollah?)

Sounding as naked of essentials as Britney Spears, the new intelligence oversight chief pleaded that it was hard to keep all the categories straight. Thank heavens Mr. Stein never got to Syrian Alawites.

Many Americans, including those in charge of Middle East policy, are befuddled and fed up with the intransigent tribal and religious fevers of the region. As Bill O’Reilly sagely remarked, “I don’t want to ever hear Shia and Sunni again.” But it is beyond the job description of top officials to wish the problems away, especially when the entire region is decomposing before our bleary eyes.

If Mr. Reyes had been reading the newspaper, he might have noticed Mr. Stein’s piece on The Times’s Op-Ed page two months earlier, in which, like a wonkish Ali G, he caught many intelligence and law enforcement officials, as well as members of Congress, who did not know the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite.

“Too many officials in charge of the war on terrorism just don’t care to learn much, if anything, about the enemy we’re fighting,” he concluded. “And that’s enough to keep anybody up at night.”

The lack of intellectual urgency about our Middle East wars is chilling. The Iraq Study Group reported that our efforts in Iraq are handicapped by the fact that our embassy of 1,000 has only 33 Arabic speakers, just six who are fluent.

W., of course, failed a foreign affairs pop quiz and still became a close ally of the Pakistani dictator he referred to as “General ... General.”

Once they have the job, the incentive of politicians to study is somewhat dulled. Charles Z. Wick, who headed the U.S. Information Agency during the Reagan years, sent a memo to his staff saying that he and the president needed to know if France was a member of NATO. Mr. Reagan had already been the president for years, The Times’s Steve Weisman reported, when he expressed surprise at learning that the Soviets had most of their nuclear weapons on land-based missiles, while America had relatively few.

One possibility is that Mr. Stein’s questions were just too darn hard. He should have pitched a few warm-ups, like: How many sides are there in the Sunni Triangle? Or: Which religious figure, Muhammad or Jesus, has not been the subject of a Mel Gibson film?

Perhaps the questions could be phrased Jeopardy-style, as in: “The name shared by two kings in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.” (What is Abdullah?)

A multiple choice might be easier on harried policy makers. For instance, which of the following quotes can be attributed to Dick Cheney?

a) “So long as the Arabs fight tribe against tribe, so long will they be a little people, a silly people: greedy, barbarous and cruel.”

b) “Don Rumsfeld is the finest secretary of defense this nation has ever had.”

c) “Certain things are not known to those who eat with forks.”

Or this: Is the Shiite crescent a) a puffy dinner roll, b) a new Ramadan moon, or c) an arc of crisis?

Once our leaders get a grasp of the basics, we can hit them with a truly hard question: Three and a half years after the invasion of Iraq, with nearly 3,000 American troops dead and the Iraqis not remotely interested in order or democracy, what on earth do we do now?