In Iraq War, Iran holds the winning cards to losing hand of the US

1. Iran looks like the winner of the Iraq war
The Islamic Republic's clout in the region, confirmed by the Iraq Study Group, could cost the United States.
By Alissa J. Rubin, LA Times

PARIS — The report issued last week by the blue-ribbon Iraq Study Group provides fresh proof of Iran's strengthened hand in the Middle East since the U.S.-led invasion: It mentions the Islamic Republic more than 50 times and makes clear that the U.S. will have to seek Iran's help for any resolution.

"The report told the Iranians, You are mighty now in the region and in Iraq. The Iranians feel now they are untouchable," said Mustafa Alani, director of security and terrorism studies at the Gulf Research Center, an independent think tank in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

The Bush administration no longer has much leverage to stop Iran from pursuing uranium enrichment, diplomats and analysts said. And the price of cooperation, Alani said, will be very high.

"They are looking for a grand bargain that includes the nuclear issue, recognition of their influence and position in Iraq, and their position in the balance of power in the region," he said.

Far from spreading democracy through the region, the Iraq war has strengthened a theocracy in which unelected religious figures make many of the crucial decisions.

"So far, Iran won the Iraq war," said George Perkovich, the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "They gained the most by far."

He said the U.S. hand was already weak on the nuclear issue because of Russia's reluctance to go along with sanctions against the Islamic Republic. But the report makes clear that Iran has substantial leverage in any negotiation, he said, because of Iran's importance in helping to quell the civil war in Iraq. "We have to deal with reality," Perkovich said.

Israel views the situation with alarm. "The idea was to make Iraq a partner in the moderate Arab camp. Instead, it has come under the influence of Iran, a state that calls for Israel's destruction," said Ephraim Sneh, Israel's deputy defense minister.

Underpinning Iran's increased clout are the U.S. failures in Iraq — a state with a Shiite Muslim majority, among whom Iran has long exercised influence — and Tehran's deft diplomacy around the nuclear issue. In a region dominated by Sunni Muslim governments, Shiite-ruled Iran has set itself up as a leader in the confrontation between Islam and the West.

Western diplomats are reluctant to describe Iran as a victor but concede that for the moment, at least, it looks that way.

"Iran won the first round," said a senior Western diplomat in an Arab state. "But there is a long way to go, and if the U.S. leaves Iraq and other countries in the region come in — Saudi, Syria — Iran's position could weaken."

Since Iran was reported to the U.N. Security Council nearly a year ago for failure to comply with the United Nations' nuclear inspections, the Islamic Republic has undertaken a major lobbying campaign in the undeveloped world, which includes many Muslim countries, aimed at shoring up support for its nuclear program.

Iranian officials have framed the Security Council action as a scheme engineered by the West to stifle the progress of less developed countries, and they have encouraged countries to assert their nuclear rights. Signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are guaranteed the right to pursue the nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes such as generating electricity as long as they forswear nuclear weapons.

Iran says it seeks nuclear technology for civilian purposes such as electricity and medical treatment, but because it kept its program secret for 18 years and there are many questions about aspects of its atomic research, Western countries believe its goal is to gain the capability to make nuclear bombs.

In what has been described as a battle between nuclear haves and have-nots, Iran has altered the debate terms to the point that a number of countries that hadn't previously expressed interested in nuclear technology are now considering it — among them Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria and Indonesia.

"We want to protect our right to civilian nuclear energy," said an African nation's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Iran has also tried to identify itself with the Muslim Middle East, rather than allowing the ethnic and religious differences between Iran and other Mideast countries to dominate the debate as they have in the past. In addition to being Shiite-ruled in a region dominated by Sunnis, Iran is Persian; nearly all other Mideast countries are Arab.

Analysts emphasized, far more than the report's authors did, that Iran's strengthened position means the nation is unlikely to see any reason to help the U.S. unless Washington meets Iran's demands.

And, they said, Iran will put such a high price on cooperation that it will be impossible for Washington to agree.

"Iran certainly would want recognition of their enrichment program, what they claim to be their rights to uranium enrichment…. They would also want lifting of [existing] U.S. sanctions, particularly on investment in oil and gas," said Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

The United States and Britain, along with France and Germany, have been the strongest proponents of requiring Iran to cease all nuclear-related activity before sitting down to negotiate.

"It's ironic that Bush, after having coined the 'axis of evil' phrase, now finds it very hard to address the Iran problem because of the failure of the Iraq policy," Fitzpatrick said. "So now they have to deal with the demons."

At the same time, the prospect that the U.S. might open negotiations with Iran strikes fear among states in the Arab world that traditionally have been U.S. allies: Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. It's a Catch-22 in which the U.S. loses if it fails to reach out to Iran but risks alienating friends if it does so.

"Any deal the U.S. makes with Iran will generate huge suspicion in the region: Saudi, Kuwait, the gulf," Alani said.

Carnegie's Perkovich echoed such comments. "The U.S. has no relationship with Iran; you have to fix that. On the other hand, the people with whom you have relationships, the moderate Arab regimes, say you're going to sell them out," he said.

"Now, how do you square that problem?"

Israel, a longtime ally of the United States, also is dismayed by the idea that Washington might make a deal with Iran.

"We're not in a position to give advice to the American administration, but we must express our deepest concerns," Sneh said. "We look to the United States, the lone superpower, to lead the struggle against terrorism and an international effort to thwart the Iranian nuclear project."

Although Iran is often coupled with Syria in the Iraq Study Group report — both countries come in for criticism for meddling in Iraqi affairs — diplomats and experts say the power and influence wielded by Tehran far outstrips that of Damascus.

"Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq," the report said.

"Syria is not going to march its army into western Iraq. The Iranians might well send troops into southern Iraq," a Western diplomat said.

In all likelihood, moderate Arab neighbors and Israel need not worry, because even the report's authors appear to think it unlikely that a deal could be struck — unless the U.S. were willing to guarantee it would not try to oust Iran's leaders.

For the moment, the chances of the U.S. agreeing to such a guarantee appear small indeed.

(alissa.rubin@latimes.com)


2. Talking to Iran
The prospect of Washington-Tehran dialogue is moving up the political agenda. But the United States must consider the moral and strategic price of such engagement, says the former crown prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi/openDemocracy.net

Public frustration with the stalemate in Iraq in the United States, reflected in the mid-term elections on 7 November, has now reshaped Congress, heralding a new era. The current strategy is being rethought and in anticipation, President Bush has commissioned two prominent Americans, James A Baker and Lee Hamilton, to lead the bipartisan Iraq Study Group to produce a fresh approach.

As an outsider I can only hope that these efforts prove salutary and productive. As an Iranian, however, I am concerned with the possible consequences of what is now being speculated.

In the past, I have repeatedly opposed any form of military action against my country as counterproductive. Today, I would like to be equally clear about expectations that Iran - and Syria for that matter - could become part of the solution in Iraq.

For some time, guilt-edged liberal opinion in America has been advocating engagement with the clerical regime in Iran. Diplomatic overtures and dialogue, inherently noble, should be the first resort in any conflict. But if policymakers wish to avoid disappointment, there needs to be a prior analysis of objectives. In this context: what is at stake, and what are the real chances of success in hoping that Iran will sanitise the climate in Iraq in a manner that is in line with US expectations?

If the US seeks Iran's cooperation in Iraq - in taming and disarming the feuding Shi'a (and Tehran-connected) militias run by Ayatollah Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr, or in encouraging prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to move towards power-sharing with the Sunni - a key question follows: what would be the Iranian rulers' price?

What price would the Islamic regime claim in exchange for undercutting its unearned foothold in Iraq, at a time when it regards the US and its global allies with acute hostility? If that price is a license to proceed with its opaque pursuit of dual-usage enrichment of uranium, could the Bush administration seriously contemplate it?

If, by contrast, Tehran seeks from any engagement a grand strategic bargain - encompassing (as well as the nuclear issue) Hizbollah, Hamas, jihadis , non-belligerence towards Israel, and a Palestinian settlement - then a different set of questions comes to mind.

In May 2003, the clerical regime signalled its willingness to come to terms with reality. The move's timing - barely a month after the lightning defeat of Saddam Hussein - speaks volumes about the motivations of Tehran's Islamist leadership. Now, circumstances have changed dramatically. The "awe" inspired by the United States blitzkrieg is replaced by contempt, meted out on a daily basis by Islamist president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad, unlike his predecessor Mohammad Khatami, is a revolutionary revivalist. His powers are limited but his rhetoric has enthralled the ultra-conservative clerics and tied the hands of the more pragmatic elements. The notion of the Great Satan, in the psyche of genuine Khomeini disciples, is ideological. For them, America is the embodiment of corrupting influences that are detrimental to Islam's flourishing.

America is also seen as the architect and protector of the Jewish state and its perceived mortification of (Muslim) Palestinians. The feud against Israel, extending to holocaust-denial, has set the regime in a hostile mould. Only compelling reasons of self-preservation will alter this. Moreover, with the Islamic Republic in its current mindset, secure in cost-free intransigence, any dialogue - particularly one wishfully aimed at cushioning America's difficulties in Iraq - will achieve nothing other than to bestow unwarranted recognition and legitimacy to a rogue regime.

There is another side to such engagement. For twenty-seven years this theocracy has cast a pall over Iran. Its young population has been robbed of the chance to live the epoch in which they are born. A full generation has been traumatised, prisoners of conscience executed and dissidents murdered in their homes or forced to flee.

George W Bush has repeatedly pledged America's support of Iranians in their struggle for freedom and democracy. To engage with the current Islamic Republic in these circumstances would render America's moral pact hollow and meaningless. It would be a further tragedy if, after failing to introduce democracy by force in Iraq, Washington now underwrites tyranny by diplomacy in Iran.


3. The Iran we have
Should the United States open talks with Iran to help ease its crisis over Iraq? As the prospect of Washington-Tehran dialogue moves up the political agenda, Anatol Lieven takes issue with the view of the former crown prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi/openDemocracy.net

I share with Reza Pahlavi the desire that Iran should be a prosperous and stable democracy. Indeed, I am rather confident that this will one day be the case. Iran possesses considerably more of the preconditions for successful democracy than most other states in the region. For one thing, unlike Pakistan, Syria, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, Iran is a genuine and ancient nation, not a recent and artificial colonial or dynastic creation. Moreover, given the disillusionment of Iranian youth with the existing system, there seems good reason to think that in the decades to come, a new generation of Iranians will bring about Iran's transformation.

In our book Ethical Realism: A Vision for America's Role in the World, my co-author John Hulsman and I part company with Reza Pahlavi over his belief that democracy in Iran can be promoted as an aspect of contemporary US strategy in the region, especially when associated with American policies that most Iranians find detestable.

As Reza Pahlavi is doubtless aware, from its very beginnings in the protests of the 1890s against the treaty establishing a British tobacco monopoly, democratic mass politics in Iran has been deeply intertwined with Iranian nationalism, and in particular with the country's hostility to real or perceived western imperialism.

The answers Iranians have given to opinion surveys concerning US policies indicate that, for the great majority of Iranians, the combination of US advocacy of Iranian "democracy" with the advancement of US and Israeli foreign and security policy objectives only discredits the forces of democracy in Iran; at least, if these are to be identified with Iranian liberalism rather than with the troubling but undoubtedly very popular mixture of populism, clericalism and nationalism being advanced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

This is especially true because Iran today is by no means the bloodstained clerical tyranny it was in the early 1980s. It is certainly not a democracy, but it contains more elements of democracy than several key US allies in the region. The electoral process which elected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was highly constrained; but all credible evidence suggests that his election did represent in part a widespread public backlash against the growing corruption of the state elites. By contrast, there is little evidence to suggest that a more genuinely open process would have produced a victory for pro-western liberals.

This being so, if we believe that Iran has a vital role to play in any future regional order, and that compromise with Iran is essential to the future of both Iraq and Afghanistan, then we have no choice but to negotiate with the Iran that we have. We cannot afford to wait a generation in the hope of getting the kind of Iran we would prefer; the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan are far too urgent for that. And if we are not to seek help from Iran and other neighbouring states, then where can we hope to find it?

This does not mean supporting the existing Iranian regime, any more than US compromises with communist China represented support for Chinese communism. On the contrary, Nixon and Kissinger's opening to China helped to bring about the long-term social and economic transformation of the Chinese system. By contrast, US attempts to isolate Cuba, North Korea and Iran have helped only to consolidate the ruling systems in those countries.

If, however, we are going to talk to the Iranians, then - as the International Crisis Group argued in its February 2006 report (Iran: Is there a way out of the nuclear impasse?) - we have to offer proposals that the Iranian establishment can actually accept; and this can only mean returning to the 1970 nuclear non-proliferation treaty ( NPT ) and accepting limited uranium enrichment under strict supervision. In addition, John Hulsman and I recommend a row of mandatory sanctions which Russia, China and other leading states will commit themselves by treaty to adopt automatically if Iran itself breaks the NPT and goes for weaponisation.

I agree that this is by no means an ideal solution; but threats of force against Iran are empty unless one is prepared to carry them through; and the probable consequences of a US attack on Iran seem to me absolutely disastrous: for western interests, regional peace, Iranian democracy - and for the personal prospects of any Iranian émigré who was foolish enough to allow his name to be associated with such an attack.