Deep Thoughts: western and eastern philosophy - time for twain to meet

The Open Sea of Thinking and the Germanocentric Frog in a Well
Against Philosophical Localism
On the necessity of the East-West dialogue in Philosophy
By Günter Wohlfart

1 I will risk preaching to the converted if I make here some remarks on the necessity of an East-West dialogue in philosophy. 1

2 What does »to orient yourself in thought« mean today? Does it not still mean to distance yourself as far as possible in order to learn to see your own path from a very different perspective? Is it not a mark of the size of the problem that we have slipped into since the crisis of European science that we need to step back as far as possible so as to avoid having only a section of it in view?

3 In post-modern times, when it is a Euro-fashion to talk about Tao and the Zen way, are we not taking Kant 's question »What does it mean to orient yourself in thought?« too literally if we answer: ex oriente lux ? Must we learn to think more orientally about philosophy and cognition? 2

4 But here, born of lazy reasoning and misology, lies the danger that we throw ourselves into the arms of exotic neo-irrationalism, of the so-called "Eastern wisdom". Here lies the danger that we meet post-metaphysical needs with obscure fumbling in the dark. Here lies the danger of transforming sober philosophical spirit into paraphilosophical ghosts. And so should the children of this "Western Zen" and "Eurotaoism" spirit be thrown out indiscriminately with the murky bath water of escapist esotericism?

5 Naturally, as far as that light from the Orient is concerned, there is a need for criticism, for critical selectivity and depth of field, the need to learn to distinguish between the bright light by which we can truly Orient ourselves and the glimmer in the dark, those lights that lead you astray, the spotlights on the bog of a metaphysical substitute, which become a »magic lantern of fantasy ghosts« as Kant put it. If we can no longer see clearly, there is the danger that we will miss the path under our feet and stumble in transcendental rubbish.

6 Therefore, a critically differentiated reception of the Far Eastern way of thinking is needed. Such a reception among scholars could be a tested method for encountering the forcing of so-called "Eastern-wisdom" into the area of sectarian para-religious subculture. The quote from Shakespeare 's 'King Lear', »I'll teach you differences« , would be a fitting motto for the work, which must beware of the "uncontrolled merging of horizons" and an appropriation that is too quick. Only the critical way between the Scylla of undifferentiated derogatoriness, disillusionment and polemics on the one hand (well known among scholarly colleagues) and the Charybdis of undifferentiated deep respect, enthusiasm and apology on the other hand, especially found among adolescent enthusiasts, still lies open. This way is a path towards the correct assessment in the critical-diacritical sense, which is just as far removed from a Eurocentric cultural imperialism as it is from an eccentric esotericism, non indignari, non admirari, sed intelligere .

Willingness and Unwillingness to Learn

7 But who is really ready to enter into a dialogue with the East Asian world? Who is sufficiently competent to be able to involve themselves in such a dialogue? Who is willing enough to learn to acquire the necessary intercultural competence? The Analects (Lun Yu) of Confucius begin with the notable words: »The Master spoke: 'Learning and constant practice: is that not also satisfying? Having friends from afar: is that not also pleasing?'« 3 The cultured man »loves to learn« . 4

8 How does our willingness to learn appear? In the West there is a definite deficiency in intercultural competence. The exchange of thought with the East is not bilateral. Most German philosophy professors travel to East Asia (if they go there at all) to export German philosophy. Importation does not take place, mostly because of - let us say - "import restrictions". Until now there has hardly been any real willingness to open the market to Eastern thought. The few exceptions prove the rule. Obsolete cultural imperialism together with narrow-minded missionary enthusiasm has left its traces even today. We can teach, but most of us are not willing to do what is done in the Far East with great success, namely to learn, to learn from other cultures. 5

9 In the East, on the other hand, you sometimes encounter an overeagerness to learn. In this respect, this overeagerness demands to be criticised because it leads to a constant "chasing after the latest in European philosophy" (as Heidegger already noticed 40 years ago) 6 and then to the attempt to overtake the "long-nosed people" (Westerners) in the philosophical race with the West. The cost is that the learners run the risk of becoming microscopists in search of philosophical crumbs. The philosophers of the Kyoto-school are doubtless not the only praiseworthy exceptions to this. In learning from the West, the homeward path was found.

10 Concerning the willingness of the Westerners to learn, I am reminded of a well-known parable of Zhuangzi, which goes: »One cannot speak to a frog in a well about the sea, as he cannot see beyond his hole. One cannot speak to a summer fly about the ice, as the fly knows only one season. One cannot speak about Tao to a scholar, as he is walled in by his scholarliness.« 7

Learning from the East: Esoteric Escapism?

11 Still today it is common for us to limit die history of philosophy totally to Western thought. A survey (by J. G. Kitzel ) covering lectures and seminars between the summer semester 1976 and the winter semester 1989/90 in the philosophical departments at the Universities of Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Vienna and Zurich, shows that at these universities 99.1 % of the programmes deal with Europe and North America, whereas only 1.0 % is dedicated to the rest of the world, of which 0.2 % for the whole of East Asia (0.1 % for China). It is a fact that Far Eastern thought at German-speaking universities is practically non-existent. Promising, no?

12 I think the unwillingness and incapability of people to learn is often an unmistakable sign of age. Could this also apply to "good old Europe" at la fin de la vingtième siècle ? Learning from the East is not to be confused with fashionable escapism into the exotic. It would be wrong to flee from what is familiar and well-known to what is foreign, unknown and strange; in the end, this usually results in a disappointed return to our own world.

13 Neither the known should be sacrificed for the unknown, nor the unknown for the known. It is even more true that the foreign and unknown is found within the known and the familiar, and that the known is found within the unknown. »Nothing interests me more than when someone takes a detour via foreign peoples and foreign lands to, in the end, just talk about himself.« 8 Forming your own ideas takes for granted the capability of taking other ideas and making them your own. The more you think for yourself the more you find in others. A person who is not open to new ideas will become obstinate and will persist inflexibly in his point of view, which gains its strength by pawing the same old ground. The encounter with foreign Asian thought can lead us to dig up the roots of our European thought in its Christian and ancient Greek foundations.

14 On the other hand, digging up these roots of European thought can open the way for a productive encounter with Asian thought. Just as narrow-minded as the former geocentricity is the present Eurocentricity, springing forth from related ways of thinking, if you can actually call it Eurocentricity at all. The problem of the xenophobia of German philosophers is not only an intercultural problem concerning mainly the East-West dialogue, it is also an intracultural one that equally affects the West-West dialogue.

About the Bleakness of the Teutonic Philosophical Province

15 If I am right, a large part of our German colleagues are not Eurocentric, but are still, or rather becoming even more germanocentric i.e. philosophical nationalists. As we should have learned from the curriculum vitae of our "Master from Germany", (the life of Heidegger), a good German philosopher today cannot be just a good German philosopher. 9 Indeed, even French colleagues have problems not only with the Far East, but also with seriously getting into the current philosophy of their near-eastern German neighbours. And is there really no connection between this aloofness towards strangers and the childish purism of the bill concerning the cleansing of the French language by a minister of culture and francophonia who wants to forbid the multicultural intercourse of words in the French language?

16 But then, do German colleagues (the exception proving the rule) not also have great difficulties in accepting current French philosophers who are suspected of becoming ingenious too quickly? Only in the courage to overcome the fear of an encounter with the unknown (the strange and foreign) and in opening our eyes to what is different do I see a chance now for German philosophy, which has become sterile through a long, mental incest, to be given sight. The German tree of knowledge sprouts and brings forth in full foliage little more than "philosophical dwarf fruits".

17 The newly raised reproach (embedded in the old spirit of thoroughness in Germany) against the post-modern, noble, "fashionable tone of a genius-like freedom in thought" of some well-known contemporary (French) philosophers may not be completely unjustified. In speaking again with Kant, is the suspicion (of French colleagues) completely unjustified that in Germany the number of scholars for whom the history of philosophy (be it German or European) is philosophy itself greatly outnumbers the few who can be bothered to dip into the source of reason itself? Naturally, the source of reason springs forth from the hills of history, but only in the "fertile depth" of experience can it develop from book-wisdom into the practical wisdom of life.

18 The number of German philosophical writers whose desks sit too dose to their bookshelves is depressing. By this I mean the authors of those humourless scholia and "charming little reflections", who do not dare write anything unless it is about someone. In other words, lost in the forest of philosophical history, they can no longer partake in the action of philosophising in itself. To quote G. Chr. Lichtenberg :»Now we are philosophising just like we varnish, according to directions. Or, just as we have minstrels but no musicians anymore, so we have only mere philosostrels and no philosophers any more...« 10

19 Whosoever is so bold as to add a soft hue of the Eastern sunrise to the mouse-grey of the mountains of philosophical secondary and tertiary literature will be considered a colourful exotic bird of paradise by the stiff German scholar in his dead seriousness. For the introverted occidental philosopher, who does not wake up to what is happening, there remains the home-game; weaving on the loom of conjecture, philosophically ridiculous, striving for his texture, busy with philosophical homework. He does not roam so far afield, but simply feeds on German health food, which is regurgitated again and again.

I'll Teach You Differences

20 Up to now philosophers of the Western World have only vague ideas of the Far East. According to Kant, in order really to form a concept out of a mere idea, one must »compare, reflect and abstract« . 11 In comparing, that means in the comparison, you notice to what extent there are differences, which leaves you to reflect on what there is in common.

21 I think that the philosophical comparison in the form of intercultural comparative studies (up to now almost unknown in the philosophical departments of German universities) is as necessary as the philosophical reflection in order to be able to get a concept of Eastern thought. In the indispensable East-West-dialogue, I see namely two dangers:

22 The first danger is the rash identification of the foreign with the familiar. The danger of the "let's come together" consists also in embracing the foreign and the familiar in such effusive philosophical xenophilia that it suffocates. Being able to agree and disagree, to converge and to diverge, are prerequisites of each other.

23 The motto of comparative studies should be Shakespeare's word »I'll teach you differences« . It is necessary to compare that is to work out our differences and problems of the East-West-meeting, instead of supporting rash solutions. Here, in particular, it is the job of the philosopher to protect questions from quick answers.

24 The second danger is the opposite, that of overemphasising the differences, the contradictions between the unknown (foreign) and the known (familiar). Here, doubtless, the even greater danger of philosophical xenophobia exists, which prevents not only every embrace (which can be very fruitful), but also every handshake. Here, reflection on what there is in common is helpful.

25 In short, we are left with the pursuit of the critical way between an overemphasis of the identity on the one hand and the overemphasis of the difference on the other. If I see it correctly, this path leads to what I would like to call identity in difference, or, correspondence. Correspondence also has the meaning of written communication as, for example, the correspondence between Bouvet and Leibniz. This correspondence was a dialogue consisting of question and response, new question etc. – a conversation by letter, which is a discourse. That means that there was neither merely consent nor only dissent. Both would have meant the end of the correspondence.

26 I think that it is our intercultural responsibility to intensify such a correspondence between East and West and to continue a dialogue which Leibniz began 300 years ago.

(Günter Wohlfart is Professor for Philosophy at the University of Wuppertal.)

Notes:
1 The contribution is a revised and abridged version of the opening speech at the first International Laozi-Symposium, which took place on May 17-21, 1993 in the Abbey Marienthal; published in: History of Chinese Philosophy 3 (1993), 39-42, in Chinese, and in: East-West Dialogue 2.1 (1997), 49-62, in English. A revised version of the text was read at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou in March 1995.
2 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche :KSA 11, 234.
3 Kungfutse :Conversations, Lun Yu , translated by Richard Wilhelm. Munich 1989, 37.
4 Kungfutse :Conversations , Book 5, 14.
5 My Chinese friend Hua Xue says: »It is important to learn and to teach, not to single out types as the master and the student.«
6 Cf. Martin Heidegger :Unterwegs zur Sprache . Pfullingen 1960, 131.
7 Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse , selected and with an epilogue provided by Martin Buber. Frankfurt/M. 1990, 81.
8 Friedrich Nietzsche :KSA 9, 185.
9 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche :KSA 11, 261.
10 G. Chr. Lichtenberg : "Von den Kriegs- und Fast-Schulen der Schinesen, neben einigen andern Neuigkeiten von daher". In: A. Hsia (ed.): Deutsche Denker über China . Frankfurt/M. 1985, 113.
11 Cf. Immanuel Kant :Jäsche-Logik §6.